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INTRODUCTION
The category of "neglected Justices" presupposes meaningful
baselines for evaluating judicial reputations. A Justice cannot be
deemed "neglected" except against the backdrop of some purported
consensus about that Justice's reputation and the reputations of other
Justices. Moreover, when the category of "neglected Justices"
encompasses the performance of Justices who served in different time
periods, it also presupposes that evaluative baselines for Justices can
retain their integrity in the face of historical change and historical
contingency.
This Article argues that when one discounts for history in the
process of evaluating judicial reputations, the effects of history are
sufficiently powerful to throw into question the integrity of baselines
for evaluating Justices, especially when comparing the performance of
Justices across time.
The Article reaches three related conclusions. First, "neglected"
Justices, considered in the flow of time, are not a small category of
underappreciated or obscured Justices, but rather the norm. Second,
the number of Justices who remain visible over time is quite small,
and the visibility of those Justices is based on their association with
David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law and University Professor,
University of Virginia. My thanks to Erin Thompson for research assistance.
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one or more of the comparatively few legal ideas that have remained
resonant for long periods of American legal history. Third, the
formidable historical difficulties that stand in the way of recovering
judicial reputations, coupled with the implicit tendency of successive
generations of commentators to equate visibility with familiarity,
leave history as the chief determinant of whether a Justice is
neglected.
In support of the Article's general argument, three illustrations
of the effects of history on judicial reputations are discussed. The
illustrations are designed to show
-how the availability of evidence about a Justice's career can obscure understandings
of how that Justice's contemporaries evaluated his performance;
-how changing cultures of information about Justices can distort those understandings;
and
-how the twentieth- and twenty-first-century literature "ranking" Justices reveals the
difficulty of formulating criteria for evaluating judicial performance that can be applied
across time, as well as the tendency of those participating in the rankings process to
"lose touch" with all but a very few Justices who served in remote time periods.
I. THOMAS TODD'S "INSIGNIFICANCE"
In the 1980s David Currie and Frank Easterbrook, in separate
articles, labeled Thomas Todd, a member of the Marshall Court from
1807 to 1826, as the most "insignificant justice" in the Court's history.1
They drew their characterization of Todd from five features of his
career. First, during the eighteen years of his tenure on the Court, he
authored only fourteen opinions. Second, he was absent for the Court's
entire session in six Terms during his tenure. Third, he wrote only one
dissenting opinion, in an indemnity bond case, of five lines. Fourth, he
authored no constitutional opinions during his tenure. 2 Finally, of the
eleven "opinions of the Court"3 that Todd wrote, ten involved "western
1. David Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
466 (1983); Frank Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 481 (1983).
2. Currie, supra note 1, at 470; Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 491-94.
3. It is important, in discussing opinions issued by Justices on the Marshall Court, to
distinguish between what was presented as an "opinion of the Court" and what we would now
call a "majority" or a "unanimous" opinion. The latter terminology presupposes a Court protocol
in which all the votes of the Justices, in all cases accompanied by opinions, are published in the
U.S. Reports. That protocol did not exist during Marshall's tenure; in fact, it did not exist until
the 1940s. A quite different protocol about the issuance of opinions was in place between 1801
and 1835. Under that protocol the opinion of the Court was typically delivered by, and written
by, one Justice (very commonly Chief Justice Marshall). Drafts of that opinion were not normally
circulated among the other Justices before it was delivered, nor in the interval between its
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lands" cases, typically title disputes over land in Kentucky, Tennessee,
and Ohio that had once been within the western boundaries of
Virginia or North Carolina. Title disputes involving those former
Virginia and North Carolina "western lands" frequently involved
nonresident claimants from those states filing against occupants of
land in Kentucky, Tennessee, or Ohio. Because of diversity of
citizenship, many western lands disputes could be brought in the
federal courts and were regularly certified to the Supreme Court from
those courts. On their faces, the cases decided only which party had a
superior title to a particular tract of land.
4
From a modern perspective, those features of Todd's career
would seem to qualify him for insignificance. But a closer look reveals
that each of the features identified and assigned weight in labeling his
performance is deceptive in its import. This deceptive quality is a
product of the fact that some information about Todd's career has not
been easily available, and the significance of other information has
been obscured over time.
issuance and its publication in the Court's Reports. Moreover, opinions of the Court did not
usually identify the number of Justices who had subscribed to their reasoning. This was because
accompanying the opinion of the Court protocol was a practice known as "silent acquiescence," in
which Justices who had voted for a different disposition of the issues in a case agreed not to
publicize their disagreements. Thus it was possible, for most of the years of Marshall's tenure,
for an opinion of the Court to have reflected the views of all the Justices, a bare majority, or some
thing in between.
When one compiles authorship of opinions of the Court by Marshall Court Justices, then, it is
generally not possible to know whether the reasoning of those opinions was subscribed to by the
author's fellow Justices. Indeed, in many cases, the other Justices on the Court would not have
been aware of the contents of an opinion of the Court when it was delivered, or when it
subsequently appeared in the Court's Reports. Calling Marshall Court opinions "majority" or
"unanimous" opinions, in all but a few cases where they were identified as such, is thus
anachronistic.
4. Another stark contrast between the Marshall Court and modern Courts can be found in
its jurisdictional requirements. During Marshall's tenure, cases that met the requirements of
Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789 could come to the Court's docket in two ways. One was
through appeals from decisions of the highest courts of states, on constitutional questions, under
section 25 of the Judiciary Act. The other, far more common way, was through the "certificate of
division" procedure, under which questions in cases that qualified to be heard by lower federal
courts, and could automatically be appealed to the federal circuit courts of appeal, were
"certified" to the Court when the two circuit court judges (one of whom was the Supreme Court
Justice assigned to the relevant circuit) stated that they disagreed on the disposition of the
questions. In the early years of the Marshall Court, these divisions were often "pro forma,"
indicating that the two judges were agreeing to disagree in order to have the questions resolved
by the Supreme Court of the United States. The result of the certificate of division procedure was
that a large number of "ordinary" common law disputes involving parties who were citizens of
different states were placed on the Marshall Court's docket. Disputes over titles to lands in
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio frequently involved competing claims by in-state residents
occupying land and out-of-state persons asserting title to that land on the basis of a grant from a
nonresident or the U.S. government. For a fuller discussion, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 157-81, 753-78 (1988).
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Todd's output of opinions, and the fact that he wrote no
constitutional opinions, needs to be evaluated in the context of the
Marshall Court's assignment practices. Marshall did not assign
opinions on an equal basis. Marshall wrote far more opinions than his
colleagues, and he wrote nearly all of the opinions in constitutional
cases (not writing only on the few occasions when he recused himself
or differed from the majority).5 Between the 1816 and 1823 Terms, all
but one of which Todd attended, the Court issued 302 opinions.
Marshall wrote 124 of those; two other Justices, Joseph Story and
William Johnson, wrote 113, and the remaining four Justices, Bushrod
Washington, Brockholst Livingston, Gabriel Duvall, and Todd, wrote
sixty-five. 6 Marshall wrote the opinions in all but two of the
constitutional cases.7 Todd's output of opinions over the course of his
career actually compared favorably with that of Duvall, who produced
fifteen in his twenty-three years on the Court.
8
In addition, a facial comparison of Todd's opinions with his
years of tenure as a Supreme Court Justice gives a misleading
impression of his output. Although Todd was appointed to the Court in
1807 and remained until 1826, he actually participated in only ten
Terms during that time span. His absence from several of the Court's
Terms was a function of the barriers that geography and rudimentary
transportation posed for travelers in early nineteenth-century
Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and western Virginia, the areas covered
by his circuit.
The Court's session in Washington during Todd's tenure
typically lasted only from early February to the middle of March, and
to get to Washington from his home in Frankfort, Kentucky, Todd had
to travel over 500 miles on various forms of horse-driven
transportation, over roads that were often inaccessible in the winter
months. His route, which took him through southeastern Ohio and
what would become West Virginia, involved crossing several rivers,
5. For more on the Court's assignment practices during Marshall's tenure, see G. EDWARD
WHITE, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth- Century Legacy, in HISTORY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 399, 405-11 (2007).
6. WHITE, supra note 4, at 184 (citing vols. 14-21 (1-8 Wheat.) of the U.S. Reports (1816-
23)).
7. The only two prominent constitutional cases during that period in which Marshall did
not write for the Court were ones in which he recused himself, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), and Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). Both cases arose out of
land disputes in which Marshall or his family had an interest. Marshall wrote for the' Court in
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819),
and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
8. WHITE, supra note 4, at 191.
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and there is evidence that in one year, 1809, he set out for Washington
only to find that accumulated snow and rain had washed out roads
and bridges, forcing him to abandon the effort in Chillicothe, Ohio, one
of the courthouse locations on his circuit.9 Since there is no evidence
that Todd had problems with his health during the first decade of his
tenure, one can surmise that travel difficulties also may have
prevented him from traveling to Washington for the 1813, 1815, and
1819 sessions. He was too ill to attend the 1823 and 1825 Terms, and
he died in the midst of the 1826 Term. He also did not attend the 1807
Term, having been appointed after the Court's session closed. Thus, a
more precise calibration of Todd's output yields fourteen opinions in
ten working Terms over the course of his career.
It was no accident that most of Todd's opinions for the Court
came in western lands cases; those cases were more important to
Todd's contemporaries than they might appear to modern observers.
The ownership and use of land was a foundational activity in early
nineteenth-century America: land was both a potentially profitable
speculative commodity and a means of achieving self-sufficiency and
prosperity through agricultural householding. Todd had been a
specialist in the law of land disputes and land titles for his entire
career as a lawyer in western Virginia and Kentucky and as a judge,
and then Chief Judge, of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 10
Understanding the intricacies of land title disputes in trans-
Appalachian states was a valuable skill in early nineteenth-century
America, and Todd's appointment to the Court came when Congress
was creating a new circuit that would encompass three of those
states." In fact, most of Todd's opinions as a Kentucky high court
judge and a federal circuit judge were about land title disputes.
However, none of them has survived; the Kentucky opinions were
9. Letter from Thomas Todd to Charles Todd (May 15, 1809), quoted in Letters of Judge
Thomas Todd, of Kentucky, to His Son at College, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 20, 28 (1913). The distance
between Lexington, Kentucky, and Wheeling, Virginia (now West Virginia), would have been
approximately 275 miles, and would have required the crossing of about seventeen rivers,
including the massive Ohio River twice. One can only imagine how long it took Todd to get from
Frankfort to Chillicothe in the winter of 1809, let alone how long it would have taken him to get
to Wheeling, which was still at least 250 miles from Washington. Thus even under the best
conditions, and allowing for the most direct routes, Todd was required to travel more than 500
miles just to attend the Marshall Court's sessions.
10. Very little has been written on Todd's career. His private papers and many of his
Circuit Court opinions have not survived. The most extensive overview of his career remains
Fred L. Israel's entry in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969:
THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 407-12 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969); see also
WHITE, supra note 4, at 318-21.
11. Supra note 10.
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destroyed in a fire in 1804 and the reporting of lower federal court
opinions was haphazard in the early nineteenth century. ' 2
The constitutional case of Green v. Biddle13 illustrates the
larger implications of western lands cases for Todd's contemporaries.
Although it originated in a title dispute in Kentucky, it raised the
question of whether the original seaboard states, in ceding trans-
Appalachian lands to new states coming into the Union, could in the
process control the rules for determining title to land in those states.
When Kentucky joined the Union, its boundaries were composed of
"western lands" in the Virginia colony's original grant. In a "compact"
between Virginia and Kentucky formalizing the cession of those lands,
the two states agreed that "all private rights and interests in lands" in
Kentucky that were originally part of the Virginia grant should
remain valid, and title to those lands should be determined by the law
of Virginia. 14 As part of the process by which Kentucky joined the
Union in 1792, Congress ratified the compact. This meant in effect
that all title claims to Kentucky land by Virginia residents could be
upheld in Kentucky courts and that Virginia law would govern those
claims. Any Kentucky resident occupying land in Kentucky, regardless
of how the land had been used, could face eviction and a suit for rents
and profits under Virginia law. This was the case even though many of
the title claims of Virginia residents to western lands, which arose out
of land warrants issued by the state treasury or as bounties for service
in the Seven Years' or Revolutionary wars, were to land that had not
even been surveyed.'
5
To protect Kentucky residents who, in the process of moving to
the new state, had bought land from speculators, surveyed it, occupied
it, and begun to improve it, the Kentucky legislature passed two
statutes between 1797 and 1812 providing that where an occupying
claimant to land in Kentucky could establish a "clear and connected"
title, that claimant would not be exposed to a suit for rents and
12. A great many western land claims disputes qualified after Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Ohio joined the Union, since they pitted in-state occupants of land against out-of-state claimants
whose alleged titles derived from Virginia warrants, and since the value of disputed lands often
met jurisdictional thresholds. For more detail, see WHITE, supra note 4, at 761-77. Details of
Todd's career are drawn from Israel, supra note 10, at 407-09. On the reporting of federal cases
in the early nineteenth century, see WHITE, supra note 4, at 385-91; Craig Joyce, The Rise of the
Supreme Court Reporter, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291 (1985).
13. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
14. The compact language is set forth in Green, 21 U.S. at 3.
15. For a discussion of Virginia's system of disposing of western lands, see WHITE, supra
note 4, at 755-63.
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profits. They also required nonresidents with superior titles to pay
occupants the value of any improvements to the land.
16
When, in Green v. Biddle, both the statutes were challenged as
impairments of the obligation of contracts and interferences by a state
with Congress's power to ratify compacts between states, the political
ramifications for Todd and his contemporaries were obvious.
Invalidating the statutes would render the title to vast tracts of
Kentucky land insecure and would impede incentives to develop land
in the state. Upholding the statutes would contravene constitutional
language preventing state legislatures from upsetting preexisting
contractual obligations and would invite states to challenge
congressionally sanctioned interstate agreements that, in retrospect,
they disliked. When Green v. Biddle, originally brought in federal
district court in Kentucky, was appealed to Todd's circuit court, he
promptly certified it to the Supreme Court, where it was heard in the
1821 Term.
17
Todd was a symbolic figure in Green v. Biddle. He had been
born in Virginia, educated there, and begun his career as a lawyer
there. He moved to Kentucky before it joined the Union and was a
pivotal figure in that process, having served as clerk to the Kentucky
state convention in 1792 and as secretary of the Kentucky legislature
between 1792 and 1801. Before his appointment to the Marshall
Court, he had been the acknowledged expert on land law in Kentucky,
in his capacity as lawyer, clerk to the legislature, and judge, for fifteen
years. He was a landowner in Kentucky. He was also committed to the
view that the Kentucky legislature could not change the terms of the
law that would govern title disputes to former Virginia western lands
in Kentucky. When Story delivered an 1821 opinion in Green v. Biddle
declaring that the Kentucky statutes materially impaired the "rights
and interests" of Virginia claimants to Kentucky land, Todd joined it.18
16. For reference to the statutes, see Green, 21 U.S. at 4-7.
17. Id. at 10. The staffing of the federal circuit courts, and the certificate of division
procedure, anticipated that Justices who had participated in the certification of cases from their
circuits would pass on the issues certified to the Court. The great majority of cases certified to
the Court from circuit courts were not accompanied by opinions at the circuit court level. In
many cases, in fact, the "division" of the circuit judges was "pro forma," which meant that they
agreed to disagree in order to allow the Supreme Court to rule on the issues on which they
professed division. The practice anticipated that the Supreme Court Justice, in his capacity as
circuit judge, had the privilege of seeking a pro forma division if he chose. Thus, Todd had a hand
in facilitating the Court's decision of the issues raised in Green v. Biddle. For more on the
certification of division practice as it was employed by Marshall Court Justices, see WHITE, supra
note 4, at 173-80.
18. For a discussion of Story's opinion, see WHITE, supra note 4, at 642-45.
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His vote signaled that he favored the sanctity of contracts over the
interests of his fellow residents.
Marshall, whose family had claims to large tracts of land in
Kentucky, 19 and Washington, who had missed the 1821 Term, did not
join Story's opinion, but Johnson, Livingston, and Duvall supported it
along with Todd. Yet the opinion was withdrawn a mere week after it
was delivered. This was because Henry Clay, who represented
Kentucky in the Senate, appeared before the Court and pointed out
that no counsel representing Biddle, the Kentucky occupant, had
appeared to argue the case. Clay also contended that invalidating the
Kentucky statutes would have a devastating effect on the security of
land titles in Kentucky. Clay moved that the case be reargued in the
Court's 1822 Term, and that motion was granted.
20
The Court did not decide Green v. Biddle until the 1823 Term,
however, and Todd missed that Term because of illness. Story wrote
Todd, in March 1823, that there had been "many struggles" within the
Court until Green v. Biddle was "definitely settled." He noted that his
1821 opinion had been replaced with an opinion written by
Washington, although Story saw "no reason to take [it] back," and that
the Justices "wanted [Todd's] firm vote on many occasions" during the
Term.21 He also told Todd that "many of the Kentucky causes," other
western lands disputes that had come before the Court, had been
"continued, solely on account of your absence." 22 Washington's opinion
in Green v. Biddle, formally joined only by Story and Duvall
(Livingston was too ill to attend the 1823 Term and Johnson
concurred separately), invalidated the Kentucky statutes but noted
that Kentucky could use its eminent domain power to take title to
vacant land within its borders, provided that it compensated the
landowners.23
19. Relatives of Marshall had made claims of ownership to over 400,000 acres of land in
Kentucky. Paul W. Gates, Tenants of the Log Cabin, 49 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 1, 4-6 (1962).
20. Green, 21 U.S. at 17-18. Story had apparently waited three weeks for a lawyer for
Biddle to present himself before delivering the opinion. Id. at 10-11.
21. Letter from Joseph Story to Thomas Todd (Mar. 14, 1823), in 1 WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 422-23 (1851).
22. Id. at 422.
23. Green, 21 U.S. at 87, 92-93. Henry Clay, in a March 9, 1823 letter, stated that
Livingston's absence meant that Washington's opinion actually represented "a minority of the
whole Court." Letter from Henry Clay to Francis Brooke (Mar. 9, 1823), quoted in THE PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE OF HENRY CLAY 75 (Calvin Colton ed., 1856). In 1826 Congressman Charles
Mercer, in the course of defending the Court's decision, declared that although Livingston had
been unable to join Washington's opinion, he had, in prior deliberations, "concurred in the
sentence of the Court." CONG. REC., 19th Cong., 1st Sess. (1826).
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The Green v. Biddle sequence illustrates the potential
momentousness of land title disputes in early nineteenth-century
America, particularly in the states governed by Todd's circuit; how
important Todd's expertise in land law, as well as the symbolic
pattern of his career, was for his judicial colleagues; and how, but for
his consistent absence from the Court and the fact that none of his
state or federal circuit opinions has survived, his importance for land
law cases might have been recognized by modern commentators.
Thus, Todd's characterization as "insignificant" by modern
commentators can be seen as largely resting on the scarcity of sources
pertaining to his judicial career and a failure on the part of those
commentators to recognize the importance of factors such as travel
from the Justices' residences to Washington, the length of the Court's
session, the assignment of opinions, and the political and economic
importance of land title disputes, that distinguish the Court on which
Todd served from its modern counterpart. Todd can therefore be seen
as a proxy for a host of nineteenth-century judges who may be
regarded as "insignificant" simply because of difficulties in retrieving
information about their careers and the historical setting in which
those careers took place.
II. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CULTURE OF INFORMATION ABOUT
JUSTICES: ASSESSING WILLIAM JOHNSON'S 1822 COMMENTS ON SOME
OF HIS COLLEAGUES
In addition to the distorting effects of scanty information about
Justices who served in previous eras, there are difficulties in making
sense of the information that has surfaced. In particular, we now
operate in a quite different culture of information about public figures,
even judges. For the nineteenth century and the first decades of the
twentieth, there were no searching biographies of Supreme Court
Justices, and very few articles focusing on their individual
perspectives or contributions. The labeling of individual Justices as
"liberals," "conservatives," or "centrists" did not appear until the
1930s. 24 Prior to the early twentieth century, works on the lives of
Justices were either autobiographical or written by members of the
Justices' families. 25 And when Justices made candid assessments of
24. For more detail, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 273-76
(2000).
25. For examples, see JOHN MARSHALL, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH (John S. Adams
ed., 1937); 1 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS 212-29 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879);
Joseph Story, Autobiography, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 1, 1-39
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their colleagues to others, those comments, for the most part, did not
appear in print during the nineteenth century.
In short, there was a nineteenth-century culture of information
about Supreme Court Justices that functioned to limit public access to
comments about their individual tendencies and perspectives. That
culture has been replaced by one in which judicial biographies, many
of them based on private papers, are common, and in which
commentators are increasingly interested in the roles of. personality,
ideology, and collegial relations in judging. 26 This shift creates a
potential difficulty for modern commentators when they come upon
nineteenth-century Justices' observations about their colleagues.
The problem lies in determining whether the comments can be
treated as an accurate index of a Justice's reputation, or simply the
idiosyncratic reactions of a colleague. Very few comments of this sort
have survived, and most of them have appeared in print only during
the modern culture of information about Justices. Therefore, it is hard
to establish a baseline for evaluating the significance of the comments.
There is a risk that in an information culture inclined to give weight
to the personal dimensions of judging, such comments, despite their
rarity may be attributed undue importance as indices of a Justice's
reputation.
An example of the difficulty in extrapolating from such
comments is provided by a letter Justice William Johnson wrote to
Thomas Jefferson in December 1822, recalling his impressions of the
other Justices of the Court with whom he first served in the 1805
Term. Johnson wrote that he soon perceived that:
[William] Cushing was incompetent, [Samuel] Chase could not be got to think or write,
[William] Paterson was a slow man and willingly declined the trouble [of writing
opinions], and the other two judges [John Marshall and Bushrod Washington] you know
are commonly estimated as one judge.
2 7
(William W. Story ed., 1852); Roger Taney, Early Life and Education, in SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR
OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY 17, 17-95 (1872).
26. The first extensive biography of a Supreme Court Justice to discuss the extrajudicial
features of that Justice's life was ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916-19).
By the 1930s such biographies had begun to appear with some frequency. CHARLES FAIRMAN,
MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1939); CARL B. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935);
CARL B. SWISHER, STEPHEN FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1930).
27. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in WHITE,
supra note 4, at 344. The combination of Johnson's less than clear handwriting and early
nineteenth-century calligraphy, plus the letter's length, may have been a deterrent to
prospective typesetters. I might note, however, that the handwriting of both John Marshall and
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is no easier to decipher than that of Johnson, yet numerous
handwritten letters of those Justices have been typeset.
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The letter in which Johnson's comments on his colleagues
appeared was twenty-one handwritten pages. 28 As far as I have been
able to determine, its full text has not yet appeared in print. It was a
response to an October 27, 1822 letter Jefferson had written to
Johnson, which was first made public in an 1899 collection of
Jefferson's writings. 29 The first scholarly work to quote the above
passage was Charles Warren's three-volume history of the Supreme
Court, published in 1922.30 Since then, Johnson's comments have been
quoted or referred to in biographies of Johnson 3 and Marshall, 32 and
in studies of the Marshall Court. 33 Johnson's memory of his reaction to
his colleagues during his first Term represents one of the very few
publicly available assessments of Cushing, Chase, Paterson, and
Washington by one of their judicial contemporaries.
34
The context of Johnson's comments, however, reveals that they
formed part of an explanation for why, during his tenure on the Court,
the Justices had abandoned an earlier practice of writing and
delivering separate opinions, issuing instead an "opinion of the Court"
that was typically delivered, and often written, by Marshall, with no
indication about whether the remaining Justices subscribed to all its
language.
35
The ostensible purpose of Jefferson's October 1822 letter to
Johnson had been to offer congratulations on the publication of
Johnson's biography of Revolutionary War general Nathanael Greene,
who had subsequently become a supporter of the Republican party.
36
Most of Jefferson's letter, however, was devoted to complaining about
the practices of the Court during the years of Johnson's service. 37 By
the 1820s, Jefferson, in retirement, had become especially agitated by
the Court. He opposed the Court's decisions in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, McCulloch v. Maryland, and Cohens v. Virginia, which had
28. Id.
29. 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 222 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
30. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 115 n.1 (1922).
31. DONALD MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER 182 (1954).
32. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 405
(2001).
33. GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HEBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER 94 (1981);
WHITE, supra note 4, at 186.
34. A few other descriptions of Cushing, Chase, Paterson, and Washington appear in
HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 86-100, but only one was made by a fellow Justice, and
that was written by Joseph Story on Washington's death in 1829, id. at 100.
35. See supra note 3 (discussing "opinions of the Court").
36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 10 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 222.
37. Id. at 222-26.
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been attacked in pseudonymous essays in the Richmond Enquirer,
whose editor was in close touch with Jefferson. Jefferson described the
decisions to Johnson as efforts to "break down the rights reserved by
the constitution [sic] to the states as a bulwark against [the]
consolidation [of federal power]."38
But the main concern about the Court that Jefferson addressed
to Johnson was its "habitual mode of making up and delivering" its
opinions.39 Its practice was that of "making up opinions in secret &
delivering them as the Oracles of the court, in mass."40 As a result, no
one could tell "what opinion any individual member gave in any case,
nor even that he who delivers the opinion, concurred in it himself.
41 If
an opinion of the Court were "impeachable," having "been done in the
dark it can be proved on no one."42 The practice was "certainly
convenient," Jefferson believed, for "the lazy, the modest & the
incompetent" among the Justices, for it shielded individual Justices
from having to "develop[] their opinion[s] methodically" or even, in
many cases, from having to "mak[e] up an opinion at all."43 Since 1807
three of the Court's seven Justices, including Johnson, had been
Jefferson's own nominees, and since 1811 the Court had been
composed of only two Federalist appointees. 44 Jefferson implied that
he found it hard to believe that every member of the Court, including
Johnson, endorsed its "consolidationist" tendencies. 45
Johnson replied that he had actually been responsible for
originating the "opinion of the Court" practice, which was
accompanied by a practice that gave individual Justices, when they
disagreed with a majority's disposition of a case, discretion "to record
their opinions or not."46 In order to understand how those practices
originated, Johnson told Jefferson that it was necessary to understand
38. Id. at 225. For more detail on the essays criticizing the Court's Martin, McCulloch, and
Cohens decisions, see WHITE, supra note 4, at 506-10, 552-55.
39. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 10 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 223.
40. Id. at 224.
41. Id. at 225.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Jefferson had nominated Johnson, Livingston and Todd, and Jefferson's Republican
successor, James Madison, had appointed Duvall and Story. The Court's composition remained
constant from 1811 to 1823. Washington and Marshall had each been appointed by John Adams.
45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 10 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 225.
46. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in WHITE,
supra note 4, at 186 n.126.
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the situation Johnson found himself in when he first joined the Court
in 1805. Upon arriving, he found Chief Justice Marshall
delivering all the opinions in cases in which he sat, even in some instances when
contrary to his own judgment & vote .... [When I asked why], the answer was
[Marshall] is willing to take the trouble, & [the practice] is a mark of respect to him [as
Chief Justice].47
The practice of having the Chief Justice deliver all the Court's
opinions preceded Marshall's tenure. On the Jay and Ellsworth
Courts, seriatim opinions, when written, were published in reverse
order of seniority, with the Chief Justice's opinion appearing last.
Those opinions were accompanied by a brief per curiam opinion,
invariably delivered by the Chief Justice if he was present, disposing
of the issues before the Court. In the latter years of the Ellsworth
Court, seriatim opinions occurred less frequently, especially when
Ellsworth was present, and Ellsworth, when present, always delivered
what was called the "opinion of the Court."48  So, Johnson's
characterization of the practice as "a mark of respect" to Marshall as
Chief Justice was accurate. Johnson, however, went on to tell
Jefferson that "the real cause[s]" of the practice were the
incompetence or laziness of Cushing, Chase, and Paterson, and the
fact that Washington and Marshall held identical views on issues.
49
In the same letter, however, Johnson provided an alternative
explanation that was unrelated to the competence of Cushing, Chase,
and Paterson. "Some case soon occurred" during his first Term, he
recalled
in which I disagreed from my brethren & I thought it a thing of course to deliver my
opinion. But, during the rest of the session I heard nothing but lectures on the indecency
of judges cutting at each other, & the loss of reputation which the Virginia appellate
court had sustained by pursuing such a course etc. At length I found I must either
submit to circumstances or become such a cypher in our consultations as to effect no
good at all. I therefore bent to the current, [and eventually] got them to adopt the course
they now pursue, which is to appoint someone to deliver the opinion of the majority, but
leave it to the discretion of the rest of the judges to record their opinions or not.
5 0
Two features of this excerpt are noteworthy. First, it was clear
that the practice of having Marshall deliver all the Court's opinions
was also serving to minimize public conflict among Justices. Johnson's
questions about the practice had been followed by his expressed
interest in publicly dissenting from an opinion of the Court. At that
47. Id.
48. WHITE, supra note 5, at 402-05.
49. Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in WHITE,
supra note 4, at 186 n.126, 189.
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point, he advanced another rationale for the practice: it discouraged
Justices from airing public disagreements, which some members of the
Court felt was "indecent" and would lower the Court's reputation. It
seems apparent that Marshall and Washington were among those
members; as residents of and legal practitioners in Virginia, they
would have been familiar with the practices and reputation of the
Virginia Court of Appeals.
Second, Johnson described himself as having been influential
in getting the Court to change from a practice of having Marshall
deliver all, and write most, of the opinions to one in which an
individual Justice would be appointed to "deliver the opinion of the
majority," and the "rest of the judges" could "record their opinions or
not."51 If one surmises that the "they" who agreed to the change were
Marshall and Washington-Cushing, Chase, and Paterson were no
longer on the Court in 1811, having been replaced by Livingston,
Todd, Duvall, and Story-Johnson was essentially proposing that in
all cases in which Marshall was in the majority, he would assign the
responsibility for writing an opinion of the Court to some Justice in
that majority, and those who had voted against the majority's position
would be free to acquiesce silently in that opinion or write a dissent.
Between 1812 and the year of Jefferson's letter to Johnson, it is
clear that the opinion of the Court and silent acquiescence practices
were in effect; that Marshall remained with the majority in most of
the Court's decisions; and that all the Justices, including Johnson,
were mainly electing to acquiesce silently in an opinion they had
disagreed with.52 Though the number of opinions delivered and
written by Marshall declined in comparison to other Justices, as Chief
Justice, he retained the prerogative of assigning most opinions. In
addition, the number of dissents, even in contested cases of great
public interest, remained minuscule. In short, the result of the
changes Johnson took credit for instituting produced the very "mode of
making up and delivering opinions" of which Jefferson complained. 53
Johnson, for his part, defended the practice of collegial opinions
in a subsequent letter to Jefferson in April 1823:
51. Id. at 186 n.126.
52. For evidence of the practice of silent acquiescence in place between at least 1814 and
1827, see the comments in dissenting opinions by Story, Marshall, and Washington, written in
that time period. These comments indicate their ordinary practice, when they had "the
misfortune to differ from this Court," was to "acquiesce silently in its opinion." The comments are
quoted in WHITE, supra note 4, at 187 n. 131.
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 10 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 223-25.
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[It will be impossible . . . to avoid.., conducting the most of our business in conclave;
for I do verily believe that there is no body of men ... who could preserve the public
respect for a single year, if the public eye were permitted always to look behind the
curtain.
5 4
Johnson "had never met but one man who could absolutely leave his
vanity and weaknesses at home" and was "often absolutely astonished
at the predominance of little passions over men in the most elevated
stations. '55 He believed that a mandatory return to seriatim opinions,
which Jefferson had urged, would lower the Court's reputation.
Thus, the more Johnson's comments about Cushing, Chase,
Paterson, Marshall, and Washington are placed in context, the more
they can be linked to Johnson's effort to defend the "opinion of the
Court" practice to Jefferson. Johnson indicated that he might have
liked to dissent publicly more often, and might do so in the future. He
indicated, however, that given the strong opposition to "judges cutting
at each other" and the reputational costs of requiring all Justices to
write opinions in all cases, he believed in the retaining the opinion of
the Court practice. 56 He also implicitly reminded Jefferson that both
that practice and silent acquiescence were engaged in by his other
appointees to the Court. As Johnson sought to defend the opinion of
the Court, he provided evidence that "the real cause" of Marshall's
delivering all the Court's opinions was not the dilatory performances
of three of his colleagues. It was the reputational advantages of
treating opinions as collective products and not requiring Justices to
issue opinions in all cases.
So, one might conclude, at a minimum, that Johnson's
comments about Cushing, Chase, and Paterson in his letter cannot be
taken as strong evidence about how contemporary observers perceived
the performance of those Justices. The problem, however, is that the
judicial information culture of the nineteenth century discouraged any
public comments about the individual performance of Justices, except
those of the ceremonial variety. One might contrast Johnson's
comments, which were obviously not intended for public circulation,
with two made by Joseph Story in the same time period. In an 1812
letter, later published in Life and Letters of Joseph Story by his son in
1851, Story wrote a friend that "[m]y brethren are very interesting
men, with whom I live in the most frank and unaffected intimacy,"
and that "we are all united as one, with a mutual esteem which makes
54. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 11, 1823), quoted in WHITE,
supra note 4, at 340.
55. Id.
56. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in WHITE,
supra note 4, at 189.
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even the labors of Jurisprudence light. 57 That was the sort of
observation by a nineteenth-century judge about his colleagues that
might eventually be made public by family members. Six years after
that letter, however, Story made some observations about Johnson to
his close friend Henry Wheaton, the Court's Reporter. He wrote
Wheaton that "some of Judge Johnson's opinions are very uncourteous
to his brethren," and that Johnson "errs most strikingly ... in respect
to a tenderness for the judgment of others."58 As in the case of
Johnson's letter to Jefferson, Story did not intend those comments for
publication. They remain in archival sources, and neither found its
way into print until the late twentieth century.5
9
In short, changes in the information culture about Justices
have had two potentially distorting effects on the assessment of
judicial reputations. First, the nineteenth-century culture of
discouraging public evaluations of the individual performance of
Justices has resulted in candid comments coming into the public
domain in a scattered fashion and making the context of those
comments difficult to replicate. Second, the altered twentieth-century
judicial information culture, with its keen attention to the role of
individual personality in judging, may incline commentators to attach
too much significance to the scattered 'material from the earlier
culture that turns up. The result is that establishing baselines against
which the reputations of nineteenth-century Justices can be evaluated
is treacherous: what might seem to be a "baseline" may in actuality be
a later commentator's effort to construct a reputation out of
comparatively flimsy evidence.
III. THE LITERATURE RANKING JUSTICES
The previous two illustrations of difficulties in establishing
baselines for evaluating the performance of Justices have been drawn
from the nineteenth century, where the problems of retrieving and
assessing information about judicial subjects might seem more acute
than in more recent time periods. One might argue, in fact, that from
the first third of the twentieth century on, concrete evidence of
57. Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay (Feb. 24, 1812), in 1 WILLIAM W. STORY,
LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 215 (1851).
58. Letter from Joseph Story to Henry Wheaton (Aug. 12, 1818), quoted in WHITE, supra
note 4, at 360 n.341.
59. Story made the comments about Johnson in an August 12, 1818 letter to Henry
Wheaton. The letter is quoted in WHITE, supra note 4, at 360 n.341.
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baselines for judicial performance has surfaced. 60 Beginning in 1928,
commentators began to assemble lists of "great" or "outstanding"
judges in American history, lists which implicitly compared the
performance of Justices who served in different eras. In the 1950s, the
process of ranking judges expanded to include some Justices whose
contributions were deemed less distinguished than those deemed
"great."
The rankings literature also began to put forth some common
criteria for evaluating Supreme Court Justices. In the 1970s, a survey
asked participants to rate the performance of all the Justices who had
served on the Court from its origins through 1969, and the authors of
the survey used its findings to label Justices as "great," "near-great,"
"average," "below average," and "failure."
The appearance of that survey stimulated additional efforts, in
the late 1970s and 1980s, to produce lists of "great" judges, and in
1989 another survey was taken, of a more diverse group of persons,
that produced not only a composite list of great Justices but the
evaluative criteria the survey participants employed in making their
rankings. That survey continues to be noted in publications stretching
into the twenty-first century.
All of this might suggest that although retrieving information
about Justices, and establishing baselines to evaluate their
performance, might pose some difficulties for nineteenth-century
subjects, a whole industry of commentators has proceeded since the
1920s as if those difficulties can be surmounted. Moreover, the
rankings literature produced by those commentators has compared
the performance of Justices not only against their age contemporaries,
but against Justices who served in other time periods, and has
developed a set of criteria for evaluating the careers of judicial
subjects. At first blush, then, it would seem as if the rankings
literature supplies a set of evaluative baselines against which to study
the careers of ostensibly "neglected" Justices.
The problem is that history has affected the rankings literature
as well. After one discounts for history in the process of exploring that
literature, both the integrity of judicial rankings and the general
applicability of the evaluative criteria used to assemble them begin to
crumble. When one considers the literature of successive efforts to
rank judges over time, two themes emerge. The rankings have an
endemically presentist bias, with commentators incrementally adding
more recent judges to their lists of "greats," and using remoteness
60. The work briefly described in the next two paragraphs will be subsequently identified
and discussed in more detail.
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from the tenure of judicial subjects as a proxy for devaluing those
subjects' contributions. In addition, even when the literature supplies
evaluative criteria for ranking Justices, historical factors undermine
the general applicability and even the coherence of those criteria. In
the end, all one can say about the rankings literature is that it
demonstrates that a handful of Justices have consistently been
regarded as having visible and significant careers, and that all the
other Justices have become, or will in the flow of time become,
candidates for neglect.
The rankings literature spans a period from the 1920s to the
present. The first two lists of "outstanding" judges were compiled by
Charles Evans Hughes in his 1928 book The Supreme Court of the
United States61 and Roscoe Pound in his 1938 book The Formative Era
of American Law.6 2 Hughes ranked eight Justices as "outstanding,"6 3
and Pound gave ten examples of judges "who must be ranked first in
American judicial history."64 Neither Hughes nor Pound gave any
reasons for their rankings. The only two Justices who appeared on
both lists were Marshall and Story, and the lists were overwhelmingly
composed of nineteenth-century figures. Hughes did not evaluate any
Justices who were still active in the 1920s, and Pound, whose book
argued that the "formative era of American law" came in the first
three decades of the nineteenth century, disproportionately included
judges who served in that time period and who had lengthy judicial
careers.6 5 Hughes included only one Justice, David Brewer, who had
served after 1900, and Pound included only two, Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo, who had both left the Court by 1938.
Although the basis on which Hughes and Pound singled out the
judges they listed was not set forth, the fact that they identified
individual judges as having eminent careers was a signal that the
emphasis of studies on American law or the Supreme Court was
beginning to change. Individual judges were beginning to play a role
in those studies. They were being viewed as distinctive contributors to
a body of American jurisprudence, rather than simply members of a
61. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928).
62. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
63. HUGHES, supra note 61, at 58. The Justices Hughes ranked as outstanding were, in
chronological order of service, Marshall, Story, Benjamin Curtis, Samuel Miller, Stephen Field,
Joseph Bradley, Horace Gray, and David Brewer. Id.
64. POUND, supra note 62, at 4-5. The judges and Justices Pound singled out were
Marshall, Story, James Kent of New York, John Bannister Gibson of Pennsylvania, Lemuel
Shaw of Massachusetts, Thomas Ruffin of North Carolina, Thomas McIntyre Cooley of Michigan,
Charles Doe of New Hampshire, Holmes, and Benjamin Cardozo. Id. at 30-31 n.2.
65. POUND, supra note 62, at 3-5.
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collegial institution that rendered decisions. Moreover, some judges
were being regarded as superior to their colleagues, and superior
performance was being regarded as a quality that could be recognized
at any point in time.
Thus, the first two defining elements of the rankings literature,
as it emerged, were its assumption that assessing individual judicial
performance was possible, and worthwhile, and its related assumption
that the enterprise of evaluating individual judges could include
comparisons of judges who served in different time periods. The next
two elements would appear in efforts to identify outstanding Justices
in the 1950s. In a 1957 article, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of
Justices,66 and a 1958 book, Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in
American Life,67 Justice Felix Frankfurter and John Frank identified
various Supreme Court Justices as "distinguished,"
68 "preeminent,"69
or "the very best"70 in the history of the Court, and claimed that their
ratings rested on what Frankfurter called "a consensus of informed
judgment,"71 and what Frank called "generally accepted" indicia of
judicial performance.7 2 Moreover, although both Frankfurter and
Frank acknowledged that the attribution of "greatness" to a Justice
was subjective, 73 they specified criteria that they associated with
distinction in a judicial career. Frankfurter mentioned a "coherent
judicial philosophy," an "originating mind," technical legal skills, and
a capacity for "penetrating analysis."74 Frank listed "clarity ofreasoning," "creativeness," "industry," and "scholarship. ' 75
With the addition of those elements, the rankings literature
offered itself as a distinct genre of commentary about judges in
American history. Contributors to that literature assumed that the
work of individual judges could be separated from the work of the
courts on which they sat and evaluated, that such evaluations could
compare performance across the span of American history, and that
the performance ratings of individual judges could be said to reflect a
"consensus of informed judgment" and to rest on common evaluative
66. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781
(1957).
67. JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1958).
68. Frankfurter, supra note 66, at 784.
69. Id.
70. FRANK, supra note 67, at 43.
71. Frankfurter, supra note 66, at 783.
72. FRANK, supra note 67, at 60.
73. Id.; Frankfurter, supra note 66, at 783.
74. Frankfurter, supra note 66, at 784, 794.
75. FRANK, supra note 67, at 60-64.
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criteria. The next step for the rankings literature would be to
deemphasize the subjective features of judicial rankings by surveying
a large enough community of persons of "informed judgment" to reach
a "consensus" about the performance of individual judges.
Such a survey was undertaken in 1970 by two legal academics,
Albert Blaustein and Roy Mersky.76 They assembled a group of sixty-
five academic "experts" on the Supreme Court, drawing from "leading
professors of constitutional law, American history, and politics," who
were "grounded in the proceedings of the Supreme Court from its
beginnings" and "specialists in many of the areas with which the
Court must deal." 77 They sent ballots to each of the "experts," listing
the ninety-six Justices that had served on the Supreme Court from its
beginnings through 1969, and asked them to "grade" the performance
of each of those Justices from "A" through "E," with A being "great," B
"near-great," C "average," D "below average," and E "failure."
Although they did not ask respondents to supply criteria for their
rankings, the ballots included "explanatory spaces" in which
respondents could comment about ratings.
78
Blaustein and Mersky published the results of their survey in
two separate journals in 1971 and 1972, and a chapter in a 1978
book. 79 They used the responses of the survey to establish performance
ratings for all the Justices who had served from the Jay Court through
the last years of the Warren Court. They categorized twelve Justices
as "great," fifteen as "near-great," fifty-five as "average," six as "below
average," and eight as "failures."80 They also gave a brief description,
76. The results of the survey were first published in Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky,
Rating Supreme Court Justices, LIFE, Oct. 15, 1971. Another version appeared, with the same
title, in 58 A.B.A. J. 1183 (1972). A more extended version was published as a chapter, Rating
the Justices: The Best and the Worst, in ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE
HUNDRED JUSTICES 32-51 (1978). In that version, Blaustein and Mersky indicated that the
survey was conducted in 1970. Id. at 34. Subsequent citations are to the 1978 version.
77. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 76, at 34. In an Appendix to the 1978 version,
Blaustein and Mersky listed the names of the persons they had polled. Id. at 118-19.
78. Id. at 35-37.
79. Supra note 76.
80. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 76 at 37-40. In presenting the data from their
survey, Blaustein and Mersky deemphasized the quantitative basis for their rankings. Although
they had obviously placed Justices into categories based on the aggregate grades the Justices
had received, the authors did not discuss how they had translated grades into categories. They
alluded to the number of votes individual Justices had received on only two occasions. One was a
statement that Marshall, Brandeis, Holmes, and Black, each of whom were listed as "greats,"
had received sixty-five (of sixty-five), sixty-three, sixty-two, and forty-two "A" grades
respectively. Id. at 40. The other was that James McReynolds and Charles E. Whittaker "share
the dubious distinction of being voted at the bottom of the list of failures." Id. at 48. In a survey
in which almost all Justices received a mix of "grades" from the participants, this failure to
provide an explicit linkage between grades and categories was noteworthy. Far more Justices
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apparently based on "the supplementary remarks of the raters," of
"standards which were invoked" in the rating process."' Their
description alluded to some evaluative criteria, such as "legal
scholarship," "analysis," "legal craftsmanship," "legal statesmanship,"
and "output," that the experts had equated with "success on the
Supreme Court."8 2 But they gave only a cursory, and at times
conclusory, explanation of the relationship of those criteria to the
placement of Justices in categories.
"All of the justices categorized as great," Blaustein and Mersky
said, "had made important ... seminal contributions to the
development of the law."8 3 The "near-greats" were "outstanding
justices who had some one flaw or limitation."8 4 The "average" Justices
"were usually well versed in legal craftsmanship and legal
statesmanship, but that was all."8 5 Those Justices "failed... to make
their presence felt either in their own time or later."8 6 The "below
average" category "seemed designed for the Justices deficient either in
legal scholarship, analysis, output, statesmanship, or in two or more of
these qualities."87 The "failures" were "either unproductive or
somehow constituted a disturbing element on the Court."8 8
Those statements revealed, first, that few respondents to
Blaustein and Mersky's survey had systematically matched up the
qualities they identified with judicial success to their ratings. They
had simply placed Justices in one category or another, and then in the
process of making explanatory remarks had alluded to some of those
qualities. The statements also revealed that when Blaustein and
Mersky sought to explain the differences between their categories,
they had little to go on and gave conclusory or implausible reasons.
Characterizing "great" Justices as those who "had made important
seminal contributions to the development of law" did not invoke any of
the qualities Blaustein and Mersky's respondents had supplied. Nor
did Blaustein and Mersky identify any "flaw or limitation" mentioned
by respondents as keeping "near-great" Justices from being rated
were rated "average" than the other categories, but Blaustein and Mersky gave no indication of
their quantitative basis for separating an "average" ranking from a "near-great" or a "below
average" ranking.
81. Id. at 50-51.
82. Id.








"great." Blaustein and Mersky also gave no reasons for why they
characterized "average" Justices as being "usually well versed in legal
craftsmanship and legal statesmanship." Although they suggested
that "below average" Justices were "deficient" in a variety of qualities
associated with judicial success, they did not say that their
respondents had equated the category of "below average" with those
deficiencies.
In fact, when Blaustein and Mersky discussed individual
Justices in each category, they noted other reasons for their
placement. Roger Taney, listed as "great," had, despite being "a strong
believer in states' rights," proved "willing to deny the states the power
to obstruct federal processes, thus enhancing the stature [of the]
Court."8 9 Samuel Miller, Stephen Field, and Joseph Bradley, "near-
greats," "might have been rated as great if they had served in a more
active judicial era."90 All of the "below average" Justices "served in the
nineteenth century and their tenures on the Court were all relatively
brief."91 And Charles Whittaker, one of the "failures," "cast the
deciding vote in forty-one crucial decisions" during his five years on
the Court, "each time standing on the side that would deny civil rights
or the extension of personal liberty."92
It was apparent from those comments that Blaustein and
Mersky had totaled up the grades each Justice had received, drawn
lines between aggregate grades at various points, placed Justices in
categories based on those lines, and then attempted, without much
help from their respondents, to explain what their categories signified
about judicial performance. The categories had not signified much.
Blaustein and Mersky could not match up the qualities their
respondents had identified with judicial success in any systematic
fashion, so they either assumed that the qualities had come into play
or gave reasons of their own supporting the categories. But they had
created the categories themselves with the grading system of their
survey.
There is also some evidence that Blaustein and Mersky's
respondents, as well as the authors, implicitly used other grounds for
placing a Justice in a category. Of the ninety-six Justices surveyed,
fifty-five were rated "average."93 Blaustein and Mersky found this
89. Id. at 42.
90. Id. at 46.
91. Id. at 48.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 47.
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"perhaps disturbing,"94 but it appears that respondents used "average"
as a default category for two sorts of Justices: those with whose
careers they were familiar, but found unremarkable, and Justices
about whom they knew little. Of the fifty-five average Justices, thirty-
eight had served in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, and of the
remaining seventeen whose careers had been mainly in the twentieth
century, only six served on the Court for ten years or more. The use of
a category as a proxy for lack of knowledge about a Justice was even
more pronounced with "below average" Justices, only two of whom
served after 1841, and none of whom had served for more than six
Terms. Finally, the Justices listed as "failures" (Willis Van Devanter,
James McReynolds, Pierce Butler, James Byrnes, Harold Burton, Fred
Vinson, Sherman Minton, and Charles Whittaker) were all twentieth-
century figures, and all associated by respondents with "anti-
progressive" postures toward economic regulation, civil rights, or other
forms of Warren Court activism.95
Finally, Blaustein and Mersky's survey, when compared with
Hughes's and Pound's lists, revealed some interesting changes in the
composition of Justices who were rated "great." Only Marshall and
Story, who had been ranked "outstanding" or in the "first" rank of
American judges on the Hughes and Pound lists, remained in the
"great" category in Blaustein and Mersky's survey. Of the other
nineteenth-century Justices on Hughes's list, Curtis, Miller, Field, and
Bradley had slipped to the "near-great" category and Horace Gray and
David Brewer to the "average" category. Meanwhile, Holmes and
Cardozo, both twentieth-century Justices who appeared on Pound's
list, remained on Blaustein and Mersky's list of greats, and John
Harlan the Elder, who had dissented in Plessy v. Ferguson, was also
listed as "great," even though neither Hughes nor Pound had
mentioned him. Of Hughes's eight "outstanding" Justices, only one
had served in the twentieth century; of Pound's ten judges, only two;
but of Blaustein and Mersky's twelve great Justices, eight had served
entirely in the twentieth century, and a ninth, Harlan, had served on
the Court until 1911.
Blaustein and Mersky's survey thus reveals that the common
assumptions of the rankings literature might be less plausible than
contributors to that literature imagined. Although Blaustein and
Mersky's respondents had proceeded to compare the performance of
Justices who served in different time periods, they had not been able
to disengage themselves from their own time frame in making that
94. Id.
95. Id. at 48.
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comparison. They had used the categories of "average" and "below
average" to place Justices about whom they knew little; listed Justices
as "failures" whose careers had been recent enough to offend the
sensibilities of late 1960s progressives and civil libertarians; replaced
several nineteenth-century Justices treated as outstanding in earlier
rankings with twentieth-century figures; and added a nineteenth-
century Justice to the list of "greats" whose view that legally enforced
racial segregation was unconstitutional, communicated in dissent in
1896, had been vindicated by the Court in the 1950s.
Despite their efforts to identify criteria that their respondents
had identified with judicial success, Blaustein and Mersky were
unable to demonstrate that those criteria, as opposed to a simple
tabulation of categories they had created, had determined the
rankings of Justices. They conceded, in fact, that "there are really no
accepted criteria for measuring Supreme Court competence," and
there was no "established touchstone for gauging the attributes" that
resulted in Justices being given "the highest accolade, or the lowest
rank, or an in-between standing."96 The survey failed in its apparent
goal of showing that the performance of Justices could be
meaningfully compared across time based on commonly held
performance standards.
The troubling assumptions of Blaustein and Mersky have been
replicated in more recent studies seeking to compile lists of "great"
Justices through surveys. A 1989 survey by the political scientist
Robert Bradley sought to update Blaustein and Mersky's effort and
also to undertake a more systematic exploration of the evaluative
criteria used by respondents. That survey has been included in
publications stretching from 1993 to 2003.97 It differed from the
Blaustein and Mersky survey in asking respondents only to identify
ten "great" Justices, to rank-order the individuals they listed, to
indicate the criteria they had used in choosing "great" Justices, and in
96. Id. at 36.
97. Robert C. Bradley, Selecting and Ranking Great Justices: Poll Results, in LEADERS OF
THE PACK: POLLS AND CASE STUDIES OF GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1, 1-22 (William D.
Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 2003). Bradley presented a sample of his survey questions
as an Appendix to his study. Id. at 20. Bradley's article had first been published, under the title
Who Are the Great Justices and What Criteria Did They Meet?, in another collection of essays
edited by Pederson and Provizer, GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1-31 (William D.
Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 1993). He made only slight changes in the 2003 version.
Unless otherwise indicated, further citations to the Bradley article are from the version in
LEADERS OF THE PACK. Both versions indicated that Bradley's sample had been taken in 1989.
Bradley, Selecting and Ranking Great Justices, supra, at 8; Bradley, Who Are the Great Justices
and What Criteria Did They Meet?, supra, at 13.
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rank-ordering the ones they had chosen.98 It also replaced Blaustein
and Mersky's sixty-five academic "experts" with four groups of persons
"who could be characterized as interested Court observers." 99 Those
were a group of "judicial scholars," culled from members of the
American Political Science Association and the Law and Society
Association; a group of Illinois state judges; a group of attorneys
practicing in the area surrounding Normal, Illinois, where Illinois
State University, Bradley's home institution, was located; and
undergraduate and graduate students who were either enrolled in
three law courses or had attended an event sponsored by an
undergraduate law society. 100 Two hundred and twenty-six persons,
composed of ninety-six scholars, fourteen judges, twenty-seven
attorneys, and eighty-nine students, responded to the survey.101
Bradley's sample was considerably larger than that of
Blaustein and Mersky's earlier survey. Despite this, and the fact that
a large number of the respondents specified their ranking criteria,
enabling Bradley to present tables identifying and rank-ordering the
criteria employed by the respective groups, the same tendencies that
tended to undermine the coherence of Blaustein and Mersky's
rankings appeared in Bradley's survey. The evaluative criteria applied
by respondents remained elusive, and the tendency of evaluators to
equate prominence in a Justice with familiarity with that Justice's
career resurfaced.
Bradley listed thirteen factors that his respondents said they
had used in identifying Justices as "great" and rank-ordering the ones
they identified. 10 2 He described the respondents' criteria as having a
"wide range."10 3 A better description might be that the criteria
introduced performance elements that were of such different levels of
generality as to be virtually incomparable. Some criteria, such as
98. Bradley, Selecting and Ranking Great Justices, supra note 97, at 7.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Bradley's "scholar" respondents were drawn exclusively from members of the American
Political Science Association and the Law and Society Association. His "student" respondents
consisted of persons enrolled in three undergraduate and graduate courses on legal topics at
Illinois State University, and "a student audience attending a mock trial jointly sponsored by a
law fraternity and university law club" at that institution. His "attorneys" were persons
practicing in Illinois; their names had been garnered from a local telephone directory. His
judicial group consisted of "state and local judges" in Illinois whose names and addresses
appeared in a 1988 list compiled by the Bureau of National Affairs of Illinois. Id. Thus, few of
Bradley's scholars had legal training; his student sample included no law students and was
confined to one academic institution; and one might well question the representativeness of his
groups of attorneys and judges, all of whom came from one state.
101. Id. at 9-11.
102. Id. at 13, tbl. 6.
103. Id. at 12.
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"writing ability," "length of service," and "intellectual/legal ability,"10 4
seemed connected to the functions of a Justice at any point in the
Court's history, and thus capable of being applied across time. Other
criteria, such as "leadership," "impact on law," "impact on society," and
"personal attributes,"'1 5 also seemed to be of general applicability, but
more difficult than "writing ability" or "intellectual/legal ability" to
apply in an objective fashion. The remaining criteria Bradley listed,
"judicial restraint," "judicial activism," "enhance Court's power,"
"protection of individual rights," "protection of societal rights," and
"dissent behavior,"106 appeared to be Bradley's attempt to translate a
respondent's idiosyncratic reasons for giving a Justice a high ranking
into more general categories. For instance, the respondent might have
applauded the Justice's "activist" or "restrained" stance, approved of
the Justice's dedication to certain classes of "rights," or liked the
Justice's body of dissents.
The elusiveness of the evaluative criteria was enhanced by
Bradley's findings about how frequently his various groups mentioned
them. As he put it: "Dissimilarities in criteri[a] for selection of great
justices among the respondent groups are evident. ."... 107 Attorneys
and students placed an emphasis on "personal attributes" and
"protection of individual rights. °108 Judges and scholars did not
mention those criteria frequently. "Writing ability" was given
prominence by attorneys, scholars, and students, but less so by
judges. 10 9 "Length of service" was treated as important by judges," 0
but by none of the other groups. "Intellectual ability" was treated as
more important by judges and scholars than attorneys and
students."'
Thus, even when evaluative baselines for Justices were built
into an effort to rank them, and an attempt was made to discern
which evaluative criteria were used most frequently, the baselines
lacked integrity because the criteria turned out to function at quite
different levels of generality, and their importance tended to vary with
the class of persons being sampled. Bradley concluded, as had
Blaustein and Mersky, that "consensus is not present as to... what
104. Id. at 13, tbl. 6.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 13.
108. Id. at 14.
109. Bradley, Who Are the Great Justices and What Criteria Did They Meet?, supra note 97,
at 20.
110. Bradley, Selecting and Ranking Great Justices, supra note 97, at 14.
111. Id. at 13-14.
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criteria identify greatness .... [G]reatness on the Supreme Court is in
the eye of the beholder." 112
The most striking aspect of Bradley's survey, however, when
one compares it with previous contributions to the rankings literature,
was the shift in the composition of "great" Justices. As noted above,
Hughes's 1928 list contained only one Justice of the first rank who had
served in the twentieth century; Pound's list two; and Blaustein and
Mersky's somewhat larger list, nine. Bradley presented the individual
rankings of each of his groups and a composite ranking by all the
respondents. Other than John Marshall, whose name appeared first
on all of the lists, only three nineteenth-century Justices were
included on Bradley's list of "greats": Harlan the Elder on the scholars'
list and Story and Taney on the attorneys'. Only five twentieth-
century Justices whose careers concluded before the Warren Court-
Holmes, William Howard Taft, Benjamin Cardozo, and Louis
Brandeis-appeared on any of the lists, with Taft's name being on
only one.
In contrast, six Warren Court Justices were listed in the
scholars' list of greats, five on the judges' list, five on the attorneys'
list, and four on the students' list. The students' list was particularly
noteworthy, given that the polling took place in 1989, three years after
William Rehnquist had replaced Warren Burger as Chief Justice. The
students ranked Rehnquist second in their list of great Justices. They
ranked Sandra Day O'Connor third and Warren Burger fourth. They
ranked Harry Blackmun eighth and Thurgood Marshall ninth.
Holmes, ranked seventh, was the only twentieth-century pre-Warren
Court Justice listed by students as "great." Seven of the Justices they
listed had served on the Warren or Burger Courts. And although
Rehnquist had been ranked (along with Story and John Harlan the
Younger) in tenth place on the attorneys' list, O'Connor, Burger,
Blackmun, and Marshall had not appeared on any other group's list.
The tendency of persons ranking Justices to equate greatness
with familiarity had become even more pronounced in Bradley's 1989
survey. If Blaustein and Mersky's list of greats is compared with
Bradley's composite list, in a period of approximately twenty years the
number of nineteenth-century Justices rated "great" had been reduced
from four to one, and the number of early twentieth-century Justices
from five to two. The number of Warren Court Justices had increased
from three to five, and one post-Warren Court Justice, Rehnquist, who
was ranked tenth in Bradley's composite, had been added to the list of




greats. Over a time interval of sixty-one years, a list of eight
"outstanding" Justices who spent all but ten years of their joint
careers in the nineteenth century had been supplanted by a list of ten
Justices, only one of whom was a nineteenth-century figure.
Thus, the very defining characteristics of the rankings
literature form the problematic quality of three of its four guiding
assumptions. The assumption that the performance of Justices could
be profitably compared over time was undermined by the recurrent
tendency of evaluators to allow their more charged reactions to
judicial subjects closer to their time frame to affect their reactions to
more remote subjects. By 1989 only John Marshall, among his
nineteenth-century counterparts, had not been affected by that
tendency. Likewise, the assumptions that a coherent set of evaluative
criteria existed for comparing the performance of Justices over time,
and that such criteria would be commonly held among evaluators, did
not survive the Blaustein and Mersky and the Bradley surveys. Those
authors conceded that no consensus existed about what criteria to use,
and Bradley demonstrated in addition that different groups of persons
employed different criteria.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the process of retrieving and assessing information
about Justices, and efforts to evaluate their performances and
compare them over time, only demonstrate that once one discounts for
history, the idea of intelligible baselines against which a judge's career
can be deemed "neglected" lacks coherence. What follows from this
conclusion? Does it suggest that, in the flow of time, all Justices are
bound eventually to be neglected? And does it further suggest that
efforts to revive the reputations of hitherto obscured Justices are
quixotic enterprises?
Answering "yes" to both questions might well seem something
of a downer for a conference on "neglected" Justices, so prudence alone
might deter me from giving that answer. But I think there are other
reasons for stopping short of the answer. The data I have presented to
critique the blithe assumption that the performance of judges can
comfortably be compared across time are also capable of yielding more
hopeful conclusions for the enterprise of restoring "neglected" judicial
reputations.
One conclusion is that not all the Justices in American history
have had their reputations obscured over time. If, instead of looking at
the changes in lists of "great" Justices from the 1920s to the present,
one looks at continuities on those lists, three figures, Marshall,
346 [Vol. 62:2:319
NEGLECTED JUSTICES
Holmes, and Cardozo, have been identified as "greats" each time a
rankings project has been undertaken. This suggests that there are a
handful of figures, even ones from remote time periods, whose
performance continues to resonate across the years, so that they are
not obscured by Justices whose careers are closer in time to
evaluators. When one then thinks about the contributions for which
such Justices are known, they appear linked to issues that have been,
and remain, fundamental to law in America. The ideas of judicial
review, separation of governmental powers, and the relationship
between federal and state power in the Constitution; the meaning of
free speech in America; the appropriate stance for the judiciary in
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation; the relationship between
tradition and change in legal doctrine; the more general relationship
between law and its social and historical contexts-those are issues
that Marshall, Holmes, and Cardozo had occasion to address in the
course of their careers. Those issues are still with us, still central
concerns of American jurisprudence. If judges can address those issues
with sufficient breadth and depth, as Marshall, Holmes, and Cardozo
did, they are not likely to be neglected. The list should remind us that
there are enough central and recurrent issues in our law to offer
judges the opportunity to speak to them in an enduring way and
thereby save themselves from neglect. So the normal flow of judicial
reputations over time need not result, in all cases, in oblivion or even
obscurity.
In addition, the data I have presented suggest that the same
techniques employed to demonstrate the difficulties in retrieving and
assessing information about judicial careers can be used to at least
partially retrieve those careers from obscurity. When considering the
question of Todd's insignificance, one can not only learn that the basis
for that characterization lies in part in scanty data, one can also make
more extended use of those data to conclude that Todd was more
important to his contemporaries than the bare outlines of his career
might suggest. Once one recognizes that the confidential
characterizations of Cushing, Chase, Paterson, and Washington by
one of their colleagues are extremely rare for early nineteenth-century
Justices, the context of the characterizations can be seen as vitally
important. The result may be that once the characterizations are
decoded, Cushing, Chase, Paterson, and Washington can be seen to
have been as "neglected" as Todd, and for comparably trivial reasons.
The fact that it is difficult for Justices to avoid being neglected over
time does not mean that there are no degrees of judicial obscurity.
Understanding the ways in which commentators have "neglected" a
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Justice may be the first step in approaching that Justice's career from
more fruitful perspectives.
In the end, all of us who seek to carve out occasional spaces of
edification from the past, and aspire for shelf life for our own work,
confront the obscuring forces of historical change. In the face of those
forces, it is as if we were Sherlock Holmes scrambling for a foothold on
the rocky cliffs of the Reichenbach Falls, fearing that any moment the
rush of water would sweep him down to join Professor Moriarity in the
abyss. Holmes managed to survive, continued his exceptional
adventures, and has thus far, like his judicial namesake, escaped
historical oblivion. We may not be comparable talents, but we can still
strive, through our work, to perch for a while on a ledge.
